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Abstract 
We examine how investment in high-value agriculture can help to address the balance of 
payments constraint on growth and the wage employment challenge in Ethiopia while 
accelerating structural change. The industrialization of freshness has significant implications for 
policy priorities.  
Development cannot be sustainable without structural change, in Arthur Lewis’s sense of a shift 
of people out of low and into progressively higher productivity economic activities. This process 
has often been (mis)understood as a rural to urban shift, or as only a departure from agriculture 
and into those sectors classified as manufacturing or industrial. However, our research, which 
draws on fieldwork in Ethiopia, shows that simple sectoral classifications have become 
increasingly unfit for purpose. Besides the process of ‘servicification’, i.e. the greater share of final 
value of manufactured goods derived from service activities like logistics, marketing and 
branding, we argue that there is a parallel process of the ‘industrialization of freshness’. Structural 
change is taking place within agriculture and rural areas rather than away from them, but the 
implications for ‘industrial’ strategies are rarely discussed. Among the influences accelerating an 
industrialization of freshness are a globalized unbundling of production, technical change, and 
the increasing significance of phyto-sanitary, quality, and ‘ethical’ standards. 
Our interviews with farm managers and owners, as well as airline managers and government 
officials, show that several agricultural enterprises are increasingly knowledge-intense, 
organizationally and technically sophisticated and by a reasonable definition ‘industrial’. 
Moreover, we find that horticulture exports embody another dimension of complex, cross-
sectoral economic activity through their reliance on extremely sophisticated logistics and 
transport. The horticulture export sector has created far greater demands and pressures for the 
development of up-to-date transport and logistics in Ethiopia than, for example, the textile and 
leather sectors.  
We then identify, within the context of the Upper Awash Valley in Ethiopia, some of the 
apparently technical but, above all, socio- political constraints limiting the potential for high value 
agriculture to contribute to growth and structural change.  
 
3 
Our method and findings are very different from the literature on ‘complexity’ and ‘product 
space’ and they query pessimistic conclusions about ‘premature deindustrialization’. And our 
findings suggest the need to rethink how industrial strategies can promote structural change: 
much more support should be directed to high value agricultural production and less focus on 
assembling garments or trainers in subsidized industrial parks. 
Keywords:  Ethiopia, exports, agriculture, industrial policy, classification, balance of payments 
constraint, employment.  
JEL Codes:  L52, L66, O13, O14, O25, Q12, Q17.  
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 Introduction : agricultural export growth is central to employment and 
avoiding growth collapse 
A key concern for policymakers in Ethiopia is not only to achieve or sustain high growth rates 
but also to avoid growth reversals. This is because long-run growth performance depends most 
on avoiding steep growth collapses (Pritchett, 2016). Avoiding growth collapses over a number of 
years may be much more difficult than achieving episodic growth spurts. Protecting against 
growth collapses requires policies that address stifling foreign exchange shortages and that tackle 
the need for a rising demand for wage labour. Further, it requires that policymakers not only have 
to do the relatively ‘easy’ work of subsidising start ups and nurturing new sets of economic 
activities but also, and more importantly, that they design interventions to sustain the dynamic 
growth of export activities beyond the early ‘easy’ phase.1 Our research suggests that in Ethiopia 
more resources should be channelled towards overcoming constraints on the expansion of quite 
well established high value agricultural exports than funnelled into new industrial plants.2  
We argue that assembling poinsettia cuttings, for instance, is no less technologically complex than 
piecing together T-shirts, jeans and sports shoes. High value horticultural assembly plants using 
imported cutting edge technology and R&D from Holland are just as ‘industrial’ as iPhone 
assembly or stitching gloves. The policy implications, for a government seeking ways to avoid 
growth collapses by overcoming the balance of payments constraint on sustained growth and, at 
the same time, aiming to meet the aspirations of a rapidly growing labour force, are likely to 
involve a shift in political focus and economic support from textiles and trainers to high value 
agriculture. In addition, a set of new policy initiatives will probably be required for particular 
sectors.  
In Ethiopia there has been a strong push to build new industrial parks and to attract foreign 
investors to set up, especially, textile and garment assembly plants in them. The employment and 
net foreign exchange contribution of these new Ethiopian state and private foreign investments, 
together with their effects in stimulating domestic linkages, remain to be seen, and they have 
substantial domestic resource costs (Gebreyesus and Demile 2017). The evidence in our study 
suggests that policy makers, in pursuing an industrial strategy, should not neglect gains from 
investing in agribusiness activities with already proven capacity to generate significant foreign 
exchange earnings and wage employment opportunities at relatively low additional cost to the 
public purse.  
1 Hirschman (1968) discussed the easy stages of industrialization and the political obstacles to achieving 
backward linkages and moving beyond the first phases of industrialization. 
2 The relationship between the volume and the value of exports provides an indication of the extent to 
which the product can be considered relatively high value (World Bank, 2004: 8). Cut flowers, fish, dairy, 
and some fresh fruit and vegetables are high value in the sense that the export value-to-volume (V-V) ratio 
is higher than for commodities such as tobacco, tea, and cereals. The V-V ratio for a product can change 
either because of price movements or because of changes to the product itself that increase its value. Such 
changes may include sophisticated just-in-time delivery of fresh fruit, quality improvements, or the 
introduction of new varietals as a result of research and development. 
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 Economic development in Ethiopia, as elsewhere, not only requires a sustained flow of imported 
inputs, but for lumpy investments (for example, in power generation or air transport) also 
requires surges or spikes in inputs of high-cost imported technology.  Growth reversals or 
collapses in developing economies have often been preceded by foreign exchange shortage, 
marked by urgent pressure to seek increased aid flows to finance immediate imported input 
requirements and the rising level of external debt (Arizala et al, 2017; Bagnai, et al 2017). Too 
often the policy conditions attached to emergency injections of concessional finance have been 
deflationary, while private sources of external finance also insist that governments adopt dramatic 
austerity measures. The result may well be a catastrophic decline in and reversal of growth. The 
tragic performance of the Greek economy since 2008 is an extreme illustration of the dangers of 
a long-term failure to expand export revenues leading to the imposition of deflationary policies 
resulting in a decade of growth reversal (Michalopolous, 2017: 252-3). In Ethiopia, where the gap 
between imports and exports growth grew dramatically during the 2000s, but where both exports 
and imports as a share of GDP have shrunk since 2012, (Figure 1), it is hard to over-emphasize 
the importance of introducing policies focused on increasing export revenues.  In all developing 
economies, raising productivity in exports is key to raising capacity to import and rising imports 
are a necessity to raise productivity and avoid growth reversal (Thirlwall, 2011). A stock and flow 
macro-balances analysis   for the Ethiopian economy confirms the significance of export growth 
to the continued sustainability of the government’s economic strategy (Coutts and Laskiridis, 
2019 forthcoming). 
Figure 1. Growth producing a widening gap between imports and exports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  UNCTAD Data on Exports and Imports (current USD) and World Bank Data on GDP 
(current USD) 
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 High-tech agricultural sectors that target fast-growing export markets are labour-intensive. 
Securing a reliable supply of high quality raw material throughput (herbs, vegetables, flower 
cuttings, fruits) generates very high levels of employment, for example in: weeding, sorting and 
grading, shifting crates into processing plants and packhouses and in and out of cold storage 
rooms, operating equipment, and in other parts of the intricate nexus of the manufacture of fresh 
and processed agricultural exports. Just as with urban industrial parks, so too with these rural 
industrial plants, there are also induced and indirect employment effects. Increasing numbers of 
pack houses and export quality agricultural output potentially makes viable a domestic supply of a 
new range of packaging materials. And at the same time rising rural employment creates rising 
incomes and demand for goods and services beyond just basic foods— leading to additional 
employment in food stalls, retail and transport services, in construction of accommodation and 
dormitories for migrant wage workers. 
One of the most obvious and dramatic examples of the employment effects of the 
industrialization of freshness in Ethiopia is the rapid growth of towns like Ziway, with large 
inward migration of people from quite distant rural areas, attracted by employment opportunities 
in and linked to the floriculture concentration there (and more recently wine production). The 
expansion of export flower production (and subsequently of a large wine estate) has led to direct 
employment in greenhouses and pack houses, to induced employment in local supply of materials 
and services for the flower industry, and in indirect employment in construction, hairdressing, 
bars and restaurants, motorized rickshaw (bjaj) enterprises, guard labour, and more. 
This employment producing flowers and wine is particularly important in the light of pessimistic 
arguments about the spectre of ‘premature deindustrialization’ and its implications for 
employment. Recent structural trends and sectoral shifts in employment in Ethiopia are regarded 
as disappointing: the officially enumerated share of total employment in Industry remains small 
(about 7.5 per cent in 2013).3 This disappointment is often linked to an essentially pessimistic 
view that the Ethiopian and African governments more generally are in the grip of ‘premature 
deindustrialization’, by which technological change erodes the traditional gains from industrial 
policy.  They cannot use the instruments of industrial policy to secure the radical transformations 
achieved in, especially, East Asia; premature deindustrialization (Rodrik 2016) is a kind of life 
sentence. The implications are particularly distressing for the huge and rapidly growing pool of 
low-skilled labour in Ethiopia: ‘deindustrialization shows up most clearly and in its strongest 
form in employment’ (Rodrik 2016, 1), and most of the manufacturing employment loss in 
deindustrializing economies takes place in low-skilled jobs. More generally, premature 
deindustrialization is often thought to mean that the gains from manufacturing as an engine of 
growth and catching up (from Kaldor’s growth laws and Verdoorn’s law to Rodrik’s automatic 
convergence effect) are effectively no longer available to developing economies. Rodrik 
concludes that African economies will have to get what growth they can from the expansion of 
3 The share of manufacturing has risen a little since 2005, while the share of employment in Agriculture 
has fallen over the same period (from about 79 per cent to 72 per cent), underpinned by a more rapid 
decline in the share of total female employment in Agriculture (from 75 per cent to 65 per cent). 
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 Services, without strong employment generating effects, and that they will have patiently to wait 
for skill levels to rise.  
There is evidence that undermines this pessimism: deindustrialization (or an inadequate growth 
of Manufacture's share in employment) in other regions of the world has not everywhere 
proceeded at the same rate; in other words, the pace and depth of deindustrialization in OECD 
economies has varied depending on policy. Thus, for example, UK deindustrialization has been 
especially pronounced compared to that in Germany. By the same token, there is surely scope for 
coherent policy to make a difference in lower income countries, to slow down or put off 
premature deindustrialization. Thus in Ethiopia, there has in fact been a rise in the share of 
industry in GDP and in employment, albeit from an exceptionally low base (Oqubay 2019). 
Manufacturing employment has also grown: from 1.1 million in 1999 to almost 1.9 million by 
2013 (Martins, 2018). And the wider evidence confirms that premature deindustrialization is not 
uniform or inevitable; countries – especially in East Asia – that adopted deliberate strategies and 
have succeeded in securing rapid growth through manufacturing show how important policy is to 
whether or not a country succumbs to premature deindustrialization (Haraguchi et al 2017).  
The evidence and argument in this report also undermine the pessimism of premature 
deindustrialization views. First, the scope for employment through industrialization may be 
significantly greater once it is acknowledged that sophisticated agriculture is itself industrial. 
Second, the scope for employment generation within such agriculture activities is considerable, 
and potentially greater than in many ‘manufacturing’ activities.  
It is crucial that agribusiness does prove capable of generating a high demand for the labour of 
new entrants into rural labour markets. UN estimates project that the population of rural 15-
19 year olds entering labour markets in Ethiopia will continue to rise till around 2040, but that 
even afterwards, by 2050, more than half of new labour market entrants will be rural, while some 
65 per cent of the total Ethiopian population will still be rural (Figure 2).  
Against this background of a continued and rapid growth in the rural labour force, in Section 1 
we discuss the classification of economic activities. We argue that the long-established simple 
sectoral division of activities is no longer the best guide to structural change or to the 
identification of policy priorities. Following a critical analysis of standard approaches to 
classification, we set out in Section 2 a new and different foundation for analyzing – and 
allocating resources between – economic activities, with an emphasis on industrial agricultural 
exports and drawing on primary research undertaken for this study. Section 3 highlights the 
constraints that producers in such activities in Ethiopia routinely face. We conclude by 
underlining the most important criteria that, in the light of the analysis in this report, may be a 
guide to policy design. 
 
8 
 Figure 2. Cohorts entering rural and urban labour markets and rural population: 
estimates and projection for Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UN, World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision, and World Population Prospects, 2017 revision; 
authors’ calculations. 
I. Structural change and the classification of economic activities 
1.1. Structural change and agriculture 
Shifting a rising share of the labour force into higher productivity activities – typically those 
characterised by increasing specialisation, learning by doing, and economies of scale – is at the 
heart of the process of development (and constitutive of the structural change) discussed by 
Lewis (1954). What Lewis actually emphasized, and then analysed, was the process by which as 
the capitalist class grew in a low-income country (often initially a foreign capitalist class) it 
gathered momentum, drawing in rising numbers of people from the ‘subsistence’ sector and, in 
the process, generating savings out of the high rates of profit made possible by low wages paid to 
a readily available flow of unskilled workers. Savings came out of profits and credit and the 
capitalist class included both privately and state owned capitalist firms.  
But the ‘Lewis model’ has been misleadingly read as a shift out of agriculture and into urban 
manufacturing. This together with the traditional understanding of (and indeed evidence for) 
Kaldor-Verdoorn insights into the contribution of manufacturing to rapid economic growth has 
often led to a relative neglect of agriculture. It seemed to make sense to focus on manufacturing 
because industrial ‘development offers a high employment, high productivity path for job 
creation, and evidence suggests it can accelerate the pace of poverty reduction’ (Newman et al. 
2012). Agriculture is often regarded as what is left behind in development (as the share of 
agriculture in GDP, and of agricultural employment in total employment, drops), even as the 
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 sector whose surplus may be squeezed to fund urban industrialization (Mundle, 1993). The 
tendency to neglect agriculture is sometimes compounded by a fatalistic belief in the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis of a secular decline in the net barter terms of trade faced by 
primary/agricultural commodities. 4   
This is mistaken. The shift from low to higher productivity activities envisioned by Lewis may 
just as much take place within agriculture as away from agriculture. There is immense scope for 
raising agricultural productivity in low-income countries - not just in traditional Green Revolution 
ways (adopting higher yielding cereal varieties, more fertilizer and irrigation) but also increasingly 
through the ‘industrialization of freshness’ – a strategy that will be discussed below. 
1.2. The functions of classification 
Classification should support understanding, analysis, and policy. It enables distinction between 
classes of phenomena. In development economics sectoral classification of activities is useful in 
understanding and comparing patterns of structural change. Ideas about the different properties 
of discrete categories of economic activity may lead to insights into the dynamics of long-run 
growth, structural change, and improvements in welfare. They may then influence the sectoral 
allocation of resources. ‘Broadly speaking, [structuralist development economists] emphasized 
that productive sectors are different in their potential to generate growth and development’ 
(Gala 2017; 1). Classification can always be criticized, since it involves the imposition of artificial 
breaks on what are typically continuous realities, in order to tame ‘the wild profusion of existing 
things’ (Foucault 1973). But so long as a classification system, with its clear boundaries between 
groups of phenomena, helps to reveal useful patterns and to suggest economic policy initiatives, 
then it is likely to be useful despite the inevitable difficulties in agreeing coding rules and precise 
definitions.  
1.3. The traditional sectoral classification has lost analytical power  
The current simple economic classification by broad sector – industry, services, and agriculture 
(with industry itself masking differences, or within-group heterogeneity, between manufacturing 
and mining) – no longer works well to distinguish between many economic activities. For 
purposes of understanding structural change and economic development, and for policy makers 
seeking to promote these aims, it now obscures more than it reveals.  
To give a simple example, what is the most appropriate way to classify a punnet of blueberries 
destined for international trade? The blueberries are not obviously ‘processed’: they are not 
pulped or juiced, they are not skinned or de-husked or pasteurised, so they have the appearance 
of a classic, albeit ‘non-traditional’, primary commodity. But they are knowledge intense: they are 
the fruit of costly and highly technical research and development into genetic plant stock 
4 A critical discussion of the evidence for Prebisch-Singer in Sub-Saharan Africa is provided by Cashin and 
Pattilo (2007). 
10 
                                                          
 material, combined with tacit knowledge about specific local agro-climatic conditions and the 
licensing of intellectual property; they are the product of sophisticated ‘capabilities’ in running 
large scale agri-business, sourcing inputs, negotiating government incentive schemes (or not), 
managing labour relations, designing marketing campaigns, making subtle adjustment judgments 
to the computer systems managing drip fertigation, lighting, and humidity management. And they 
are complex in their production and packaging, in the logistics of just-in-time exporting, and in 
their sales. Price and profitability depend in part on the health benefits said to be linked to them 
(blueberries being marketed as a ‘super-food’, high in anti-oxidants). So it was perhaps not 
surprising to hear the owner of a South African blueberry exporter lifting a blueberry from its 
punnet, rolling it between two fingers, and declaring: ‘this is a pill’.  He regarded his business as 
part of ‘big pharma’ (Cramer and Sender 2015). Should blueberry production benefit from state-
subsidised incentives, public investment in R&D and infrastructure, and allocation of resources 
to promote blueberries in large and growing international markets? Many policymakers and some 
development economists would be doubtful, because, they would argue, blueberries are produced 
on farms, not in factories; they are not manufactured goods characterised by a large scope for 
linkages, for economies of scale, for learning by doing. But their arguments may be mistaken. 
Herrendorf et al. (2014, 929) agree that it would be ‘useful to refine the standard three-sector 
focus’ of the literature on growth, production, and structural transformation. They note that 
some services like health care and education involve massive investment and high skill intensity, 
and are characterized by high scope for productivity increases, while others such as much of retail 
trade are very different. The three-sector classification of agriculture, manufacturing, and services 
is far too crude to capture these changes in recent economic developments, especially in 
advanced economies. But they also show how different ways of measuring growth—by value 
added or by final product—differ in how they capture the relative weight of sectoral activity. 
It is not just that, for example, there is increasing interdependency between manufacturing and 
services, as can be seen by exploring the World Input Output Database (Timmer et al 2014). 
More significantly, there is a process of ‘servicification’: the increasing share of the value of final 
manufactured goods derived from services - logistics, transport, embedded software, branding, 
design, etc. (Koopman et al. 2010). This process underlies the dramatic increase in the share of 
world expenditure on services (as shown in Figure 3). Baldwin et al. (2015) argue that services 
have accounted for an increasing share of the value of final goods since the 1980s, and that in 
Asia, for example, the pattern of servicification is similar for relatively high-tech economies like 
Japan and South Korea and for lower wage economies like that of the Philippines. One 
important implication for development policy is that the ‘classic focus on factories can be 
misleading’ (Baldwin et al. 2015, 26). 
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 Figure 3. Share of world expenditure on goods and services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lewis et al., 2017: 1 
The focus on servicification has begun to encourage discussion of the breakdown of barriers 
between manufacturing and services, but it is still often assumed that these two ‘modern’ sectors 
are distinct from agriculture. In fact, it can seem as if some economists are stuck with very old 
ideas, even if economies themselves are moving on. For example, Gala et al (2017: 2) admiringly 
quote Adam Smith: ‘The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in 
agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their 
superiority in the latter than in the former’. And this because: ‘The nature of agriculture, indeed, 
does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one 
business from another, as manufactures’ (ibid., p.7, Book 1).5 This leads Gala et al to make the 
astonishing claim that: ‘Specializing in agriculture and extractive industries does not 
enable…technological evolution’. But in fact agriculture – at least a great deal of agriculture 
globally – has changed dramatically over the last 25 years. It no longer fits Smith’s diagnosis, nor 
in fact that of Hirschman (1958, 109) who also argued, quite reasonably at the time, that there 
was far less scope for forward and backward linkages in agriculture than in manufacturing. One 
source of this change is the rise in sophisticated, globally integrated agribusiness.  
 
5 Even in the final sub-clause, the anachronism of parts of Smith’s analysis is striking; for the separation 
between firms, very much in manufacturing as in other activities, has been eroded by the ‘global business 
revolution’ (Nolan et al, 2007) with its giant systems integrator firms and its cascading tiers of suppliers 
often with legal separation but de facto highly integrated, not arms length, arrangements among firms.  
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 Food systems in the twenty first century involve different activities to those considered 
agricultural in the past; the industrialization of agricultural production means that consumer food 
prices are largely decoupled from the domestic or international prices of agricultural 
commodities. The farm value share of consumer food expenditure in the US (and elsewhere) has 
declined rapidly over the last 50 years, now amounting to about 15 per cent (Gollin and Probst 
2015, 15). Most food is initially produced on large-scale units owned by a few farming 
corporations or ‘landless farmers’ (Cramer and Sender 2015) and distributed by a similarly 
concentrated group of giant supermarket retailers (Wrigley and Wood, 2018). Delivering these 
industrial products to consumers involves scale economies and an industrial mode of 
production.6 A high and rising share of food consumption, especially in the advanced capitalist 
economies, is accounted for by ‘ultra-processed’ food products. ‘These are not modified foods, 
but formulations mostly of cheap industrial sources of dietary energy and nutrients plus additives, 
using a series of processes (hence “ultra-processed”). All together, they are energy-dense, high in 
unhealthy types of fat, refined starches, free sugars and salt, and poor sources of protein, dietary 
fibre and micronutrients’ (Monteiro et al, 2017: 1).  
In parallel to the rise of agribusiness and ultra-processed types of food there has been an 
‘industrialization of freshness’. The blueberry example above is one illustration among many. A 
fresh orange exported from South Africa to the EU would seem to be a primary commodity and 
would be classified as such in the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system, 
as would a blueberry (under A), while a carton of orange juice might be regarded as more high-
tech and as a manufactured product (C.103 in ISIC, which includes manufacture of fruit juices). 
Yet the carton of orange juice is industrially very simple and uses low quality oranges that would 
not meet the stringent quality standards for international trade in fresh oranges. Securing a 
reliable supply of high quality fresh oranges for the EU or other demanding markets is more 
complex, and more technically difficult than producing a carton of orange juice. Below we 
develop this idea, drawing on fieldwork in Ethiopia to show its relevance in low-income 
developing countries. The industrialization of freshness is on a par with servicification and it 
helps to show how awkward, how poorly ‘fit for purpose’ are many efforts to develop economic 
analysis on the basis of misleading classifications and simplistic definitions of ‘processing’. And 
we argue that the influential work of Wood (2017: 9) is misleading, when it asserts: ‘Processed 
primary exports are…clearly more skill-intensive than unprocessed primary exports’. 
1.4. Efforts to refine categorical distinctions  
Economic activities within sectors have become ever more closely intertwined, till the level of 
categorical imbrication breaks down the distinctions between them. In response to the 
shortcomings of the standard three-sector classification of economic activity, economists have 
made a number of attempts to refine the categories or introduce new ways of distinguishing 
among outputs. These have been suggestive: they do attempt to capture the dimensions of global 
capitalism poorly accounted for by corralling activities into the three rudimentary paddocks of 
6 The massive and increasing scale of farms in the USA and the dramatic recent consolidation of farm 
production are discussed in MacDonald et al (2018). 
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 industry, services, and agriculture or primary commodities. Economists have also suggested 
policy conclusions, though not always dramatically new or different ones compared to the most 
widespread policy advice internationally. But these recent categorical endeavours have some 
significant shortcomings, which we will discuss in some detail below.  
One influential exercise designed to reveal key patterns, dynamics and trends in the global 
structure of production is the work on economic complexity: Hidalgo and Hausmann define 
complexity in terms of the ‘mutliplicity of knowledge’ embodied in outputs and as expressed in 
the composition of output. Generally, their Economic Atlas of Complexity shows that richer 
countries produce more complex outputs than lower income countries. There is, however, 
variation. This variation can be explained because outlier countries (with a higher ‘economic 
complexity index’ (ECI) score than would be predicted by their average income per capita) may 
be expected to grow faster than others at similar income levels (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009).  
This work has also been linked to ideas of ‘product space’, such that countries are expected to 
produce and export most easily a range of goods that are closely related to what they already 
produce: patterns of production and trade are path dependent. And others suggest that there is a 
range – largely occupied by middle-income developing countries – where economies may begin 
to shift away from the ‘normal’ path to produce outputs less closely related to what they already 
produce (Pinheiro et al 2018: 3). The key technique for Hidalgo and Hausmann in identifying 
shades of complexity is to assess where a product fits along the axes of ‘ubiquity’ and ‘diversity’. 
Complex products are not produced by many countries: they are not ubiquitous. But some 
products are not ubiquitous yet are not highly complex either – diamond mining, for example. So 
an index of complexity for a country needs to assess product diversity too: whether a country 
produces a wide array of products. If an economy is characterised by diverse products and 
relatively rare – non-ubiquitous – products, it is deemed to score highly on the ECI.  
There is some circularity in the definitions of complexity. Economies are complex if they 
produce complex goods. Knowledge intense places are ‘those that produce knowledge intense 
activities, and knowledge intense activities are those produced by knowledge intense places’ 
(Pinheiro et al 2018: 5). And it is difficult to escape the impression that much of the analysis is a 
(sophisticated) way of describing the rather obvious: for example, the idea that ‘high income 
countries have a higher tendency to diversify into more unrelated and sophisticated technologies’ 
(Pinheiro et al 2018: 6). It is also unclear why there is so much variation and what accounts for 
shifts over time. The implication – and the apparently underlying assumption – is that movement 
up the ECI scorecard is usually determined by prior changes in comparative advantage, very 
slowly shaped by realignments of factor endowment and signalled by market prices. Pinheiro et al 
(2018: 6) simply echo the old Washington Consensus view when they suggest that countries with 
‘more liberal, and less coordinated, forms of capitalism’ are more likely to move into more 
diverse production structures. Despite the evidence that some countries have a much higher ECI 
than their income per capita would predict and that some countries clearly shift into ‘unrelated’ 
products before becoming classified as high income economies, ‘these results do not imply that 
all countries are able and should [sic] invest in unrelated variety growth’ (ibid, 24).  
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 Some of the economic complexity literature appears to rely on a version of the augmented 
Hecksher-Ohlin factor endowment approach to comparative advantage in Wood (2017). In 
Wood’s view shifts in the global pattern of production and trade are largely in line with and 
accounted for by differences in the ratio of cultivable land to skills (partially mediated by the 
reduction not only in production costs but coordination costs in an era of globalized trade). 
Others stress the dangers of ‘defying comparative advantage’. Like the old dependency theorists, 
these economists are pessimistic about the sustainable results of encouraging foreign direct 
investors to export products that are not as labour intensive as a country’s existing endowment of 
labour suggest they should be. For example, they believe that the medium-term results in most 
low-income developing countries of defying comparative advantage by attracting FDI into 
complex processing industries ‘could well hinder further transformation of the productive 
structure by locking the economy into a specialization trap in assembly industries’ (Lectard and 
Rougier, 2018: 105). 
Further, there is a methodological problem with the economic complexity index. It is built in 
reverse and smacks of data mining; the starting point is to use recent international trade data to 
find ‘revealed comparative advantage’ and to proxy for the structure of production. One 
commonly acknowledged problem with this is that it may lead to an under-appreciation of 
complexity in those economies that have large domestic markets, produce a diverse range of 
outputs, but are not big exporters of diverse goods. Another difficulty is that this approach 
makes assumptions about the complexity of products, of their level of embodied technical 
knowledge (explicit and tacit), based on ubiquity and diversity, without direct observation of 
production processes. This may work well as a convenient insight into certain dimensions of 
complexity but it risks failing to pick up some forms of complexity and sophistication -  in 
agribusiness, for example. Data problems, including the lack of a sufficient level of disaggregation 
in international datasets, compound the problem. As Gala et al (2017: 3) put it, the ‘kind of 
empirical analysis we do here is, thus, somewhat ad hoc, due to the unavailability of data at the 
disaggregation level needed’. Their own example shows that it is ‘not easy to empirically separate 
manufacturing related services from other types of services’ (idem).  
One illustration of the difficulties faced by the economic complexity literature is in the treatment 
of Brazil. According to analysis of panel data on economic complexity: ‘Problematic emerging 
countries show no productive structure improvements; the spotlight, here, falls on Brazil that 
shows one of the worst dynamics of ECI among emerging countries in recent years’ (Gala et al, 
2017: 4). But this assessment of Brazil appears to flow from a prior definition of agricultural 
production as lacking complexity. It is difficult to understand Brazilian economic growth, without 
recognising that many of the most dynamic activities have precisely been in very large-scale, 
knowledge-intense, technically sophisticated and innovative agriculture (OECD-FAO, 2015: 62; 
Hopewell, 2016). Large farms (over 500 ha) are making a critical and a growing contribution to 
exports and to the total value of Brazilian agricultural output (Helfand et al, 2017). Brazil’s 
Arabica coffee yields per hectare are the highest in the world (Neumann, 2012: 19). Brazil leads 
the world in efficient sugar and soya production (Safdar, 2015). Brazil’s success in paper and pulp 
and related products, leather goods, ethanol, cotton, soya, poultry, etc. owes a lot to the 
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 integration of agriculture with manufacturing, publicly funded research and development, and 
services (including government services, which are arbitrarily deemed to be less sophisticated by 
definition than private services). 7 Brazilian experience also suggests far more emphasis should be 
given to policy choices than to ineluctable, path dependent structural patterns.  
Other recent literature makes some progress in overcoming the dismissive analytical assumptions 
about the ‘sophistication’ of agriculture and its role in structural change. Mendez-Ramos et al 
(2017) distinguish between ‘primary’ and ‘manufactured’ agribusiness, on the back of empirical 
analysis showing the huge and rising significance of agribusiness trade in the growth of 
developing countries in recent decades. Divanbeigi et al (2016) summarise how structural 
transformation has taken place within the agriculture sector through modernization and technical 
change, rising productivity, and increasing integration with other sectoral activities. Drawing on 
the SIC system (see above) they make an effort to allocate agribusinesses between primary, 
(including the agriculture, livestock and fisheries SIC sub-categories), and manufacturing 
agribusinesses (falling into one of ten SIC sub-categories: canned, cereals, drinks, leather, meat, 
oils, paper, tobacco, wood, and other). Together with their acknowledgement (p.1) that traded 
agribusiness ‘cannot exactly be determined, given its links with other activities in the economy’, 
their work provides a clear illustration of the difficulties in avoiding ad hoc allocations and 
establishing clear coding rules and observations to support a rigorous, consistent, and useful 
classification scheme.  
Some analytical confusion has always existed in economists’ research on these topics, because of 
the way that trade and production statistics internationally classify sectors of production. Wood 
and Mayer (1998), for example, distinguish between three groups of product: manufactures, 
processed primary products, and unprocessed primary products. Their definition of manufactures 
is narrow: they use the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories 5-8 minus 
non-ferrous metals. SITC classifies everything else as primary products, whether processed or 
not. Production and employment statisticians, though, as Wood and Mayer point out, use the 
broader, ISIC, category of manufactures that includes what Wood and Mayer (1998, 6) consider 
processed primary products, i.e. goods that are ‘also produced in factories, but which use large 
inputs of local raw materials—for example, canned tuna, wine, cigarettes, paper and aluminium 
ingots’. 
Wood and Mayer make a further breakdown of their initial grouping of products, to account for 
high skill and low skill manufacturing, for agriculture and minerals and fuel, and for a division of 
agriculture into ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ products. Dynamic products here are those for which there 
is a high (greater than one) income elasticity of demand and whose expansion has been important 
7 There is nothing new in this. Henry Ford’s Model T assembly line innovations owed a great deal to agro-
industry: The ‘industry that apparently had the greatest influence on Ford was meatpacking, where the 
disassembly of animals was done by hanging newly killed carcasses on an overhead conveyor, moving them 
from worker to worker, each of whom made a particular cut or removed particular pieces, until the animal 
had been reduced to smaller chunks of meat that might then undergo further processing. Implicit in 
continuous flow processing was an intense division of labor’ (Freeman 2018: 121).  
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 to the growth of a number of developing countries. 8 Their point is that there are unprocessed 
but nevertheless dynamic primary commodities (1998, 11). Our suggestion is that there may be a 
high income elasticity of demand not only for agricultural products that are ‘industrial’ in our 
terms, but also for products that have other high value attributes (being organic or with other 
ethically or emotionally valued attributes). 
We have outlined some of the different, overlapping, and at times conflicting ways of classifying 
primary, processed primary, and manufactured goods. They all share the idea that these types of 
good require different resource inputs. In Wood and Mayer, for example, ‘the basic difference 
between the resource inputs needed for manufacturing and for primary production is that the 
former requires a much higher ratio of skill to land’ (1998, 4), with the implication that 
agricultural production requires very little skill because it requires little by way of transformation 
and value addition to what nature and some tried and tested practices provide. Their idiosyncratic 
definition of processed primary products includes only those products where processing takes 
place in factories. But in modern agricultural production even the distinction between ‘harvesting’ 
and ‘processing’ is not always clear cut; in the USA, for example, it has been suggested that 
harvesting be defined to include extremely sophisticated (quasi-processing) operations, such as: 
‘cooling, field coring, filtering, gathering, hulling, shelling, sifting, threshing, trimming of outer 
leaves of, and washing raw agricultural commodities grown on a farm’ (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration, 2016: 8). 
1.5. The ‘intricate nexus’ of industrial or roundabout production  
A more fruitful way to understand processing and manufacturing than a factory focus is to 
consider the historical evolution of manufacturing and the industrial. Adam Smith (1776) refined 
analysis of different types of division of labour, including the division of labour in the production 
of specific goods, such as a woolen coat, 
“the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the 
sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the 
weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their arts in order to 
complete…this…production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have 
been employed in transporting those materials from some of those workmen to others 
who often live in a very distant part of the country!...How many ship-builders, sailors, sail-
makers, rope-makers, must have been employed in order to bring together the different 
drugs made use of by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the 
world” (Smith [1776], 1979, 22–23).  
As Ho (2015) points out, Smith was analyzing the earlier stages of industrial capitalism; Marx, 
later ([1867] 1977), was able to describe and analyze the transition to large-scale industrial 
8 Another tradition in economics regards certain products as ‘dynamic’ or as ‘manufactured’ by reference 
to the degree of transformation in the production process, the degree of ‘roundaboutness’ in production. 
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 capitalism. First, the work of individual workmen and their tools in Smith’s division of labour is 
transformed by power-driven machinery. Then machines are deployed in larger collective and 
organized systems.  
While Marx may have emphasized the tendency towards economies of scale within specific firms 
and the integration of large-scale production, Young (1928) emphasized more the complementary 
tendency to industrial differentiation, the splitting of complex processes into sets or chains of 
simpler processes. Over ‘a large part of the field of industry,’ wrote Young, ‘an increasingly 
intricate nexus has inserted itself between the producer of raw materials and the consumer of the 
final product’ (1928, 538; quoted in Ho). From Young’s perspective, what matters is less whether 
or not production takes place in factories than what forms of industrial organization are at play 
and how roundabout is production.  
Hirschman came to accept that there are more linkages backward and forward— as well as fiscal 
and consumption linkages—associated with agricultural production than he had initially 
supposed.  His views on the dynamic potential of primary commodity linkages have recently been 
re-stated, as well as simplified, by Kaplinsky (2011).  But neither Hirschman nor others 
anticipated the extent to which the sophistication of roundabout production processes and 
complex forms of industrial organization might move into agriculture. An ‘increasingly intricate 
nexus’ is currently inserting itself between African rural producers, of a fresh orange, blueberry, 
avocado or pelargonium, and the consumers of the final product in the supermarkets of 
advanced capitalist economies. This makes for the industrialization of freshness.  
Moreover, the development of more processed products may depend on innovation within the 
primary agricultural sector itself. Brazil—a world leader in the paper and pulp industry—provides 
one example. The success of this sector is underpinned by state financing of one of the world’s 
leading centers of agricultural research, EMBRAPA, which coordinates a decentralized network 
of research institutes that have been central to the diversity of experimentation that innovation-
based strategies in agriculture require (Correa and Schmidt 2014). For example, the development 
of new seed varieties of eucalyptus trees by EMBRAPA researchers (more than 2,000 PhD 
graduates among them) has been central to the product innovation in Brazilian paper and pulp 
products (Figueredo 2014).  
Similarly, in Chile state commitment to university research and training in agronomy and to 
establishing collaboration with the UC Davis-Chile Life Sciences Innovation Center - that 
addresses key issues of plant pathogen detection, genetic identification of nursery stocks and 
water use efficiency – underpins a horticultural industry with an annual export value of about 
$4.5 billion (Moran, 2018: 1).9  Chile’s success in exporting fruit reflects a broader and important 
trend: between 1995 and 2013, the growth in the value of world imports of agricultural 
commodities was quite rapid, but much faster growth rates were achieved by those agricultural 
products classified as ‘consumer-orientated’. The USDA distinguishes between three types of 
9 In 1980 the value of these exports was only $168 million (Larson et al, 2015: 84). 
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 agricultural products: bulk, intermediate and consumer-orientated; they define bulk and 
intermediate goods as: ‘homogeneous and/or storable and used primarily by industry. In contrast, 
consumer-oriented products like fruits, nuts, vegetables, meats, and processed food products may or 
may not have a high income elasticity of demand, but are likely to be purchased directly by 
consumers’ (Beckman et al, 2017:18).   
II. A basis for moving away from sectoral classification of activities 
2.1 A different analytical starting point 
Rather than working backwards – as the economic complexity index does, taking published trade 
data as a proxy for an enduring productive structure and basing the analysis entirely on ‘what can 
be “seen” from historic trends in world trade data’ (Gala et al 2017: 4) – we begin with the direct 
observation of current productive activities in Ethiopia. We also consider activities more broadly 
than Palma (2014), acknowledging that the allocation to standard sectors of particular economic 
activities may be ambiguous; we focus on the scope for particular activities to lead to rising 
productivity, complexity or sophistication, and to employment gains. Our method starts by 
drawing on primary field research rather than secondary datasets. And we deploy a definition of 
the ‘industrial’ that focuses on the insertion of an ‘intricate nexus’ between raw commodity and 
output and on the development of ‘roundabout’ economic processes. This definition takes in the 
‘lengthy linkage of production phases’ (Gala et al 2017: 2) of interest to scholars of economic 
complexity.  
And this method leads to the finding that agriculture is, to hugely varying degrees, highly and 
increasingly complex. This is so in ways that confound even the brave efforts to distinguish 
between ‘primary agribusiness’ and ‘manufactured agribusiness’ or the more usual distinction 
between primary commodity exports and processed primary commodities. We find that the 
‘collective pool of resources’ that Gala et al (2017: 3) argue is shared between manufacturing and 
services (through ‘industrial commons’) is often also shared with agriculture. And given the 
increasing complexity, technical sophistication, scope for rising labour productivity, and scope for 
large-scale employment (and foreign exchange earnings), we then go on to argue that policy 
priorities (and resource allocations) derived from misleading categorical analysis may reduce 
growth rates and expose economies to a greater risk of growth collapses. The policies we 
question may be poorly designed to maximise the prospects of rapid employment growth among 
the poorest (i.e. they are not sufficiently ‘inclusive’); they may not generate the highest possible 
rate of growth of employment for a given level of investment. Further, as we argue below, 
recalibrating activities away from traditional three-sector classification may show that in some 
respects deindustrialization, and the spectre of premature deindustrialization, is illusory.10  We 
illustrate these arguments by detailed reference to two types of agribusiness activity in Ethiopia – 
plant propagation and the manufacturing of juice. 
10  Besides, the evidence confirms that premature deindustrialization, even on traditional sectoral 
distinctions, is not an inevitable stage of capitalist development but has a great deal to do with policy 
choices (Haraguchi et al 2017; Palma 2014). 
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 2.2 Plant propagation (ISIC Rev.4: A.013) 
The asexual propagation of plants, by cuttings or division, is assumed in the ISIC system to be a 
simple agricultural process. And in its basics it is, but once a certain scale is introduced and a level 
of care applied to assure the right conditions to ensure higher productivity while meeting 
international phyto-sanitary requirements, propagation becomes a more roundabout, intricate 
process. The process depends on the plant and where it is grown. In Ethiopia, for example, there 
are perfect conditions for propagating pelargoniums but to propagate higher priced poinsettias 
the air is too dry so techniques must be applied to raise and manage humidity.  
Firms specializing in propagation of ornamentals are integrated into a global production network. 
The ‘value chain’ runs from the establishing of a mother stock, through propagation of cuttings, 
setting new plants in plugs, packaging and transporting these to the Netherlands (from Africa, 
Latin America, or within the Netherlands from more costly heated glass greenhouses), 
development and repotting, transfer to garden centres and supermarkets, and final sales. At the 
apex sit Netherlands-based integrator firms. In one case, a relatively small firm based in the 
Upper Awash Valley in Ethiopia was set up as a legally independent entity but relied on very 
close links to a huge Dutch firm; in 2017 the propagator became formally part of the larger firm. 
Both firms where we interviewed use reverse osmosis (RO) technology to remove unwanted 
particles (especially bicarbonates) dissolved in water. A reverse osmosis machine may cost 
€150,000 and it costs €30,000 to change the membrane. One of the firms uses its own solar plant 
to generate power. Under the plastic greenhouse canopies, elaborate piping along the ground and 
up in the metal frames enables a precise regulation of water and nutrients, of misting to maintain 
humidity levels required for poinsettia plants, and light. One firm owner agreed that they have to 
‘torture the plants’ by regular spates of (radium bulb) light on and off, a form of sleep deprivation 
for the cuttings. One 12 hectare propagation farm spent €50,000 on a single piece of equipment 
to produce fine misting in a greenhouse. Plastic greenhouse covers are much cheaper than the 
glass ones that have to be used in the Netherlands but they are far from crude, developed on the 
basis of many years of R&D. Each plastic sheet has seven layers, including UV filters.  
Adhering to strict phyto-sanitary rules regulating market entry into the EU involves, among other 
things, very careful management of clothing and of movement between greenhouses or between 
a greenhouse and other parts of the farm. Firms have rules for who can enter greenhouses, what 
they wear, and how they must tread through disinfectant pools between inside and outside the 
greenhouse. One cutting edge large-scale firm had large blocks of lockers where the hundreds of 
workers store their own clothes and change into overalls and imported ‘crocs’ sandals. These 
rules add to the demands for labour supervision, and this may come to form part of the tacit 
knowledge that sets a parameter for judging the optimal maximum size of a cuttings farm. We did 
a rough count of about 50 computers in the administrative offices of this farm. Profitability also 
requires ‘guard labour’ (Bowles and Jayadev, 2004) and technology: one firm was, in early 2018, in 
the process of switching from fingerprinting to face recognition technology to manage security 
on site. 
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 Figure 4. Misting, light regulation, pest control (Upper Awash Valley) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ photograph 
Figure 5. Changing area, Dümmen Orange (Oromia)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ photograph 
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 The nexus of activities, mechanisms and processes inserted between the raw commodity (the 
origins of the mother stock) and the final consumer is an intricate one. It has been driven by a 
variety of forces, including the global unbundling of production, pressures to respond to input 
cost and pressures of resource scarcity, and the increasing role of phyto-sanitary, quality, and 
other product standards. The assembly of a poinsettia involves a great deal of machinery (power 
plants, reverse osmosis machines, tractors, computers, misting and fertigation equipment, soft 
plug production, steaming soil to disinfect it, laboratory testing facilities, cooling the cuttings to 
4 degrees for 24 hours, maintaining refrigerated trucks) and is distinctly roundabout. Firm 
managers accumulate and deploy tacit knowledge – about highly localised agro-climatic 
conditions and variations, about labour relations and supervision requirements, about ‘the 
market’, about sources of efficiency in the organization of production, about the broader policy 
environment, institutions and politics in Ethiopia that affect their operations. This combines with 
a great deal of technical expertise. For example, technical and tacit knowledge have gone into the 
‘fifty years of breeding’ to produce a mother stock of ten plants held by one European firm in 
Ethiopia. (For political reasons a decision has recently been made to divide this precious stock 
into two, holding half in Uganda). So plant propagation is ‘knowledge intense’ and in this sense 
complex or sophisticated. There are also multiple, complex linkage effects between plant 
propagation on a farm and packaging, input production and supplies, capital goods, work 
clothing production, transport, logistics, and the development of cold storage and freight facilities 
at Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport (see below). The extent to which these linkage 
effects are being exploited by a capitalist class within Ethiopia is problematic and we discuss this 
below. Finally, the difficulty in classifying plant propagation (given the weaving together of 
manufacturing, agriculture and services) was brought home to us by the manager of one firm 
propagating ornamentals whose offices were papered with the arty branding and advertising 
posters of the linked multinational firm. We used to think we exported flowers, he said. ‘Now I 
realise we are exporting emotion’.11  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dümmen Orange 
11 The branding company that redesigned the visual branding of Dümmen Orange wrote in a case study: 
‘We crafted a new accompanying tagline, For You, which instantly captures a sincere, universal expression 
– often shared with a gift of flowers – that speaks to the very heart of their mission’ 
(http://www.bigredrooster.com/case-study/dummen-orange/). 
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 2.3 Manufacture of juice (ISIC Rev.4: C.103) 
Manufacturing fruit juice (and pulps or purées) would seem a step up in sophistication from 
simple agriculture. We have already questioned this assumption, pointing out that producing high 
quality fresh oranges for export may be more challenging, more technically complex and 
knowledge-intense, than squeezing poor quality oranges into juice cartons. A similarly paradoxical 
contrast might be drawn between a low-value and technologically unsophisticated ‘processed’ 
product like avocado oil and a fresh export quality avocado, specifically bred, pre-cooled, chilled, 
packaged and processed to ripen (in post-harvest gaseous ripening facilities) exactly three days 
after shipment to EU supermarkets. ‘Just in time’ industrial organization, famously developed in 
Japanese manufacturing, is now fundamental to the competitive success of international 
agriculture. International agreements such as the Global Gap voluntary standards, widely used in 
international trade and in contracts with the major retail groups, have accelerated these trends, 
imposing requirements for barcoding, traceability, spraying and residue detection—all part of the 
increasingly intricate nexus inserting itself between increasingly large-scale “farming” and the final 
product at the point of purchase.  
Certainly, the process for juicing passion fruit or mangoes fits into Allyn Young’s discussion of 
industry: it is broken down into a series of intricate steps and requires specialized equipment. 
Condensing juice into concentrate requires even more sophisticated and costly evaporator 
machinery. Most of the equipment – the pulping and juicing machines, the condenser, and the 
machines used to pack mango or passion fruit puree into aseptic bags – is imported from Parma 
in Italy, a global leader in agricultural processing equipment (buying an evaporator might cost 
roughly $700,000). Figure 4 reproduces a mango puree extraction flow chart from AfricaJuice 
Tibila S.C. in the Upper Awash Valley (Ethiopia). There are 20 main steps between receiving the 
fresh fruit and dispatch from the processing shed (besides the other steps associated with waste 
and by-product management).  
It is this machine-mediated process that most obviously qualifies juicing as manufacturing. But it 
is managing production in the fields of sufficient, reliable supplies of good enough quality 
passion fruit (or mango) in the first place that makes this business particularly complex, 
sophisticated, and difficult. We develop further below the distinction between easy and difficult, 
for it matters to policy. But the relevant indicators are, first, that the condensing machinery at a 
large passion fruit firm where we interviewed has never been used and, second, that in this farm as 
in other related farms in Ethiopia capacity utilization of the juicing equipment has been very low, 
because of inadequate and erratic throughput of raw material.  
 
 
 
23 
 Figure 6. limited throughput of high quality passion fruit (Upper Awash Valley) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ photograph 
While we focus below on the types of constraint typically holding back the expansion of high 
value agricultural exports from Ethiopia, here we highlight some features of large-scale passion 
fruit farming to show the complexity of the production process. Passion fruit provides a very 
good example of a feature common across much high productivity agribusiness: it depends on 
just-in-time production processes. As in the Japanese auto industry, these processes require 
sophisticated organization of production. In agriculture just-in-time production probably also 
depends more on tacit knowledge than the more readily codified and transferrable knowledge in 
auto-assembly. Across hundreds of hectares trellises with the right tautness of the wires between 
poles bear the weight of passion plants, whose fruit bearing shoots hang down growing fast in 
the light and warmth of the Upper Awash Valley. The plants have to be continuously pruned to 
maximize fruit bearing and to make sure the drooping tendrils do not reach the ground. The fruit 
has to be harvested every day (though there is a lull for a couple of months). And the most 
important part of the process is the daily hand cross-pollination, i.e. pollinating between flowers 
on different plants across from each other on different trellises. The ‘birds and the bees’ would 
not produce anything like a commercially viable rate of pollination. And this hand pollination 
must be done within a one-hour slot each afternoon. That means supervisors have to monitor 
flowering quickly and precisely across a large area and to manage pollinators. (Another example 
of just-in-time agribusiness is in pelargonium cuttings, which must be harvested one day, packed 
the same evening, transported to Bole International Airport, and flown to Europe the next day.) 
Large-scale hand pollination, daily pruning and harvesting, in variable climate conditions with 
(see below) troubled access to water is what really presents a challenge of complexity to a 
business and its (in this case global) financiers.  
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 Figure 7. Mango Puree Extraction and Process Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from sheet at AfricaJuice Tibila S.C. 
2.4 The state owned airline infrastructure at the heart of agricultural exports 
Horticulture exports embody another dimension of complex, cross-sectoral economic activity 
through their reliance on extremely sophisticated logistics and transport. The horticulture export 
sector has created far greater demands and pressures for the development of up-to-date transport 
and logistics in Ethiopia than, for example, the textile and leather sectors. This is because 
delivering freshness (whether in flowers or fruit) requires cold storage and just-in-time air 
delivery; a delayed delivery of textiles or leather goods might cause significant financial loss and 
reputation damage, but is unlikely to be disastrous. Cold storage includes both the on-farm cold 
rooms (including the rapid cooling facility required by herb producers) and the airport cold 
storage warehouses.  
Through complex feedback mechanisms the demands of horticulture have both contributed to 
and been supported by the remarkable of growth of state-owned Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) - now 
the leading passenger and cargo carrier in Africa and one of the world’s most profitable airlines. 
The initial growth of the floriculture sector was facilitated by EAL and at the same time created a 
pressure for EAL to provide airfreight facilities.  They began by leasing ageing cargo jets, but the 
expense of this, as well as the rapid growth in floricultural exports, led the company to buy new 
freight jets. As of early 2018 EAL had eight freight jets and planned to grow to 19 by 2025. EAL 
(which is now divided into seven different businesses) also plans to expand the 1 million ton 
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 warehouse capacity to 1.5 million tons by 2025. It employs 13,000 people, with planned 
expansion to 17,000. EAL already works with global firms to improve human resources and 
infrastructure management and is developing a joint venture with DHL to integrate itself into the 
global value chain for logistics.  
Not only has Ethiopian Airlines developed state-of-the-art cold storage and warehouse facilities, 
a catering enterprise, an international hotel, and numerous routes in Europe, Asia, and North 
America, it has also become a regional aviation leader in sophisticated activities such as aircraft 
maintenance, as well as pilot and crew training. Moreover, the urgency of the need to develop 
just-in-time delivery has had an indirect ‘political’ linkage effect: it has prompted EA to become 
the focal point in the long-overdue modernisation of the Ethiopian Customs and Revenues 
Authority. This has been achieved in two ways. First, EAL has become, more than any business 
association in Ethiopia, the main actor that pressures the customs authority to expedite 
transactions. Second, it is near completing a series of advanced technology e-customs platforms 
to facilitate and trace imports and exports. (This development may have a further benefit if it 
facilitates the timely collection and analysis of reliable trade data, the lack of which is a significant 
constraint on effective policy making.)  
The literature on economic complexity sometimes labels ‘government services’ as simple, 
unsophisticated. But the pursuit of profitability in Ethiopian horticulture and floriculture shows 
how government services, including security services, cannot be treated as categorically distinct 
from sophisticated agro-industrial exports. Milling about outside the airport cold storage facilities 
are armed soldiers. It is mandatory for horticulture exporters to have state security provision on 
every truck from farm to customs point. Farm managers we spoke to were happy with this 
arrangement, which reinforces the ways in which an effective state provides the conditions of 
accumulation and profitability.  
III. Constraints on the expansion of sophisticated agricultural exports from 
Ethiopia 
It has not, for several reasons, been possible to achieve an accelerating expansion of high value 
agricultural exports from Ethiopia, or to reap the benefits and spread effects of such an 
expansion. The constraints on the expansion of these exports obviously include ‘resources’ like 
land and water, infrastructure and input supplies (the state of the roads, unreliable power 
supplies), the tangle of rules, regulations and bureaucratic obstacles that slow down and raise 
costs of trading, foreign exchange shortages, and other issues that at first blush may be defined as 
straightforwardly economic or technical. 12  But every single constraint turns out to have a 
fundamentally socio-political source. Long ago Hirschman (1968) observed the same thing in 
trying to understand the dynamics of industrialization in Latin America: ‘there is far more to the 
vigor or weakness which late industrialization displays in various countries than minimum 
12  Getahun et al’s (2018) survey of constraints on manufacturing competitiveness in Ethiopia 
complements our findings. 
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 economic size of plants, market size, and even foreign exchange availabilities…the 
process…depends on…numerous economic, sociological and technological factors…’ (ibid., 
p.24). 
Although we regard the ‘sociological’ factors as decisive, we begin by drawing attention to the 
inadequacy of the statistical base available to policy makers; we then highlight some of the main 
resource constraints, infrastructure and input supplies, and institutional issues, in each case 
showing how the issue affects the growth of exports, profitability, productivity and employment 
before pointing to the deeper socio-political determinants of resource and institutional 
constraints. Then we discuss the distinction between ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ phases and dimensions 
of structural change and the industrialisation of agriculture. We finish the section by suggesting 
that economic policy in Ethiopia in recent years is characterised by the political economy of 
being in a rush. This perspective emphasises the links between the deep-seated, historically 
enduring political economy of Ethiopia and the technical aspects of economic policy 
management and performance.  
3.1 Data gaps and inconsistencies 
Effective resource allocation requires reliable data. To work out whether interventions have had 
the desired effect, to assess eligibility for support according to strategic criteria, to manage the 
social and political implications of investments, subsidies, land leases, and tax incentives, to weigh 
up the relative returns to alternative allocations of scarce public funding: all these depend on the 
consistent collection and reporting of accurate, relevant evidence.  
It may be, for example, that horticultural exports, because of the relatively sophisticated activities 
involved in their production and trade, generate greater value added and export revenue per 
dollar of investment than ‘industrial’ goods such as standard mid-level quality leather or textile 
goods. But it is not possible at present to make this kind of judgement precisely because of a lack 
of readily available data.  
Putting the primary field research for this study into a context of broader trends has not been 
easy, because of a number of difficulties in establishing convincing time series trends. Different 
Ethiopian official sources do not agree with each other; and there are differences between trends 
and levels reported by Ethiopian agencies and international agencies, despite the latter drawing 
primarily on Ethiopian official data for their own estimates. For example, Figure 5 illustrates this 
using data on the volume of tomato exports, drawing on UN COMTRADE, ITC World Trade 
Map, and Ethiopian Horticultural Development Agency (EHDA) data. The international data 
series themselves draw on Ethiopian figures, including Ethiopian Revenue and Customs 
Authority (ERCA), Central Statistical Agency (CSA), and EHDA data.  
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 Figure 8. Estimated trends of Ethiopian tomato exports in three data sets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ITC, EHDA and COMTRADE data, authors’ calculations. 
Looking closely at specific data sets compounds these difficulties. For example, to establish a 
trend in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) category for cabbages 
and lettuces - HS070511 – from EHDA data is made difficult by the lack of reference to any of 
the versions of HS. There are more than twenty categories in the EHDA data mentioning either 
‘cabbage’ or ‘lettuce’. Using the categories ‘cabbage lettuce’, ‘cabbage lettuce’, and ‘cabbage and 
lettuce’, and using data from international data sets as well, produces quite sharply contrasting 
pictures of the level and trend in exports (Figure 6). 
There are further complications with the EHDA statistics. Their data set has no metadata. The 
division of products does not consistently follow the HS guidelines. Many categories of 
horticultural product overlap. Sometimes reference is made to the number of boxes exported or 
the brand of a product, while for other exports it is not even clear what product the EHDA 
refers to. Potential and current investors in the sector cannot consult the EHDA’s web site to 
obtain up-to-date disaggregated statistics on the area planted, the volume produced and the 
volume exported for even the most important fruits, vegetables or herbs produced in Ethiopia 
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 Figure 9. A salad of estimates: trends in cabbage and lettuce exports according to 
different sources 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
3.2 Resources/Inputs 
Complications in access to land, water and electricity featured repeatedly in interviews with the 
owners and managers of agricultural export firms in Ethiopia as major constraints holding back 
plans for expansion. But for none of these inputs was there a simple form of scarcity. There were 
even contradictory signals of abundance and scarcity. For instance, in the Upper Awash Valley 
some claimed there was plentiful water and land but for others there were pressing shortages. A 
mix of policies and politics lay behind the ways these input issues constrained output. Other 
evidence confirms the primary significance of these constraints. Thus, a study of the Ethiopian 
Investment Commission (Sutton, 2018) found that the most common issues brought to the 
commission (by all medium and large enterprises) to resolve were to do with land and electricity 
supply.  
3.2.1  Land 
Land is the most obvious constraint for many investors. It affects some more than others – 
because of where their investments are and because of the requirements of production; for 
example, generally growing roses or ornamental cuttings requires less land than a vegetable 
exporting enterprise. Sustaining a viable vegetable exporting business requires field rotation. For 
this reason, and also to ensure a high enough throughput of harvested crops to make it economic 
to build a modern packhouse (with all the High Care Facilities required to meet international 
market standards), a firm needs at least 500 ha and possibly up to 1,000 ha. Vegpro, perhaps the 
largest horticultural enterprise in Kenya, produces about half of its horticultural exports on its 
own 7 large farms in Kenya, but has expanded to invest in a farm of over 1,000 hectares in 
Ghana.13 A number of the newer enterprises in business left the horticultural market in 2013/14 
because they could not achieve a viable size.  
13 Matchmaker Associates, 2017. 
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 One way some firms try to address the scale problem – if they are not able to secure direct access 
to more land – is to develop outgrower schemes. Interviews suggested that commitment to 
outgrower schemes is a strategy undertaken half-heartedly because it is not possible to expand 
land directly under production, and that the rhetoric of ‘corporate social responsibility’ and 
‘sustainable development’ or engagement with ‘the local community’ is attached to make a virtue 
of a necessity. One Ethiopian horticulture producer, for example, told us that working with 
outgrower schemes is ‘the only way to live here’. The actual experience of outgrower schemes in 
the areas where we carried out research has been disappointing. Often outgrower schemes are set 
up just beyond the boundaries of a large investor farm and are designed to create a kind of 
protective moat around the core business. Especially in the wake of large scale political protests 
and attacks in 2016 (see below) firms like the Upper Awash Agro-Industries (an investment by 
Sheikh al-Amoudi) have not only installed well-armed security details on farm but have handed 
over land on the periphery of a large estate to ‘local youth’ to farm.  
It is not surprising, then, that land is cited as the single most important constraint. One senior 
business manager of an Ethiopian owned horticultural exporting firm, a man with a long 
experience in the association of horticulture producers in the country, stated emphatically that 
access to and administration of land is a more important constraint on the expansion of 
horticultural exports than access to subsidised credit, tax breaks, import costs or delays, foreign 
exchange access or any other issue. The Chairperson of the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers 
and Exporters Association (EHPEA) agreed and said that land is the ‘single biggest constraint’. 
Others too confirmed the land issue as a major one they faced. One or two firms have been 
particularly adroit in acquiring additional land through distress sales or defaults, managed by the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia. But even these firms wanted and were finding it impossible to 
get more land near their farms, especially when these were farms near Addis and in Oromia. The 
government is keen to side step these problems by opening up new horticulture and floriculture 
production zones, e.g. near Bahir Dar. But established investors in the sector are unconvinced: 
there are unresolved problems with the pH level of soils in the selected area and road transport 
costs are higher. Ethiopian investors argue that foreign investors are more likely to be attracted to 
Bahir Dar because domestic investors usually have families and want the better schooling 
available in Addis Ababa.  
The state technically owns all land in Ethiopia but access and use is regulated by federal and 
regional authorities and also involves, often, negotiating compensation agreements with people 
who previously laid claim to land. Some investors argue that the level of compensation itself is 
not a big problem: but either people accept compensation and then later raise complaints and 
new claims, or compensation is agreed but the regional authorities block land transfers, perhaps 
because they are themselves ins search of financial inducements. So there were a number of 
complaints made to us about the Federal and the Regional Land Distribution Committees. A 
Dutch farm manager in the cuttings business made detailed plans to expand on 10 ha of land 
adjacent to the farm he ran. The plans were ‘scuppered by woreda officials’ but the land itself 
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 continues to be unused for any productive purpose.14 Differences between state institutions cause 
additional uncertainty. A herb-growing farm near Hawassa, for example, is anxious about the 
effect on land availability (and labour costs) of the new industrial parks on the edge of town. The 
government had signalled that it would help the firm to relocate but this assurance was 
foundering on differences between levels of government.  
3.2.2 Water 
Confusion between different levels and agencies of government also adds to the ways in which 
water becomes a particularly fraught resource. In the Rift Valley, and particularly the Upper 
Awash Valley, where most of our interviews took place, there were varying views on the extent to 
which water is truly scarce. Water is extremely cheap, and that is one source of attraction to 
investors, but investments to ensure its sustainable distribution are not being undertaken by 
government agencies at different levels. And there is rising awareness that the uncertainty of 
water availability is becoming a larger issue affecting productivity and there is clearly rising 
friction between users. Friction among users and regulatory uncertainty, in a context of 
expanding cultivation and of climate change and extreme weather events (above all, El Niño), is 
confirmed in other recent research (Parker et al 2016). ‘Historically, Ethiopia’s investments to 
reduce the negative impacts of hydrological insecurity and harness its water for power, food 
production, industry, livestock and improvements in health and livelihoods have been limited’ 
(ibid., p.13).  
Little seems to be being done effectively to manage competing demands and rising tensions 
around water access and usage. Some agribusinesses in the Upper Awash Valley complain that 
the authorities are favouring influential smallholders and the state owned sugar company. They 
claim that the large state owned farm wastes most of the water withdrawn by using inefficient 
overhead sprinkler systems. The federal government is promoting horticultural exports while the 
Oromia regional government is promoting its own smallholder irrigation projects producing for 
the domestic market ‘with no reference to upstream and downstream users’ (ibid. p. 20). The 
most blatant example of favouring production for the domestic market rather than exports is the 
plan to triple the area under sugar at the Wonji estate while, downstream, the Upper Awash 
Agro-Industry Enterprise - a large part of the huge former state owned agribusiness in the valley - 
faces water shortages that may limit its ability to expand exports.  
Firms in the valley are dealing with the water issue in different ways. Some enterprises claim to be 
going to considerable lengths to store, conserve and efficiently manage water and, for example, to 
regulate their own use to free up access some days and times each week for local smallholders. 
But others appear to find it difficult to persuade their owners or financial backers to invest 
enough in efficient water management. Yet yields of high value export crops like passion fruit, 
grown in one part of the valley, are sensitive to variability in water inputs. The unclear 
14 A woreda is a third level administrative unit, smaller than zones and larger than the smallest unit, the 
kebele. 
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 institutional and policy management of water stokes local complaints. For example, one foreign 
investor farm manager is convinced that smaller local capitalist farmers with 25-50 ha are bribing 
Woreda –level officials to divert water from large export schemes to their own onion fields and 
that local police have been turning a blind eye to vandalism of investors’ irrigation gates.  
One of the largest cut flower exporters in Ethiopia, Dümmen Orange, also lamented the lack of 
any infrastructure investment in rainwater collection facilities. There is clearly large potential for 
this since the area (within the Rift Valley) averages 700 ml of rainfall per year. Not only would 
this reduce the need for costly water treatment investments, it would improve the volume and 
reliability of the water supply as well increasing the range of lands that could become viable sites. 
Investments in rainwater collection would likely increase the profitability, output and productivity 
of investments, all of which would increase the contribution to the already significant 
contributions to net foreign exchange and employment the sector already makes. 
3.2.3 Labour 
Firms commonly cite labour issues as a constraint on expansion. Owners or managers of 
domestically owned and international firms operating in low-income countries are wont to 
complain about the discipline and reliability of the local labour supply. This has very much been 
the case in Ethiopia. A common complaint in the floriculture business since its inception was the 
high labour turnover rate (Gebreeyesus and Sonobe 2012). This was often blamed on young 
women being lured off the flower farms by the dangerous promise of earnings from domestic 
service in the Middle East. At one point the government banned labour migration to the Middle 
East, though later it relented. More recently, high labour turnover rates have been observed and 
puzzled over in the new garment factories in the industrial park in Hawassa.  
Respondents in interviews carried out for this study offered mixed views on this issue. Labour 
turnover was certainly an issue for some, though the advantages of competitive labour costs still 
seemed to outweigh this. On one farm, employing 1,200 people, 95 per cent of them on 
permanent contracts (and of these 70 per cent are women), the management replaces around 
400 every year: ‘about 200 go off to the Middle East or go off sick or have to look after their 
children and about 200 we kick out’. But perhaps the most striking evidence came from large 
international firms based along the road south from Adama towards Ziway. Asked if high labour 
turnover at one very successful, large flower producing enterprise was a constraint on 
productivity, profitability, and expansion, the manager dismissed the question. The farm has no 
problem hiring 2,500 seasonal workers and many of the same people return year after year for the 
peak season. ‘When I arrived’, said the manager, ‘everyone wanted to leave’. But now there is a 
functioning clinic on site, 700 of the workers are members of a rotating credit scheme run by the 
company, and the basic wage rate is relatively high - 1,200 ETB/month (plus free lunches, 
transport to and from work, and medical cover). The manager of this company said that these 
conditions were pretty much the same ‘along this stretch of the road’ among other agribusiness 
employers; and claimed that pay was higher than in the new Hawassa industrial park and in the 
factories around Debre Zeit (Bishoftu).  
32 
 This manager had also built a crèche for the children of workers on the farm, whose facilities 
were shared with another foreign owned flower firm nearby. That contrasted with the 
interference from local authorities that another farm manager had had to deal with when 
proposing to build  a crèche at the farm he ran in the Upper Awash Valley. This businessman had 
wanted also to set up an on-site clinic and needed a licence to dispense medicines. The licence 
application was rejected at zonal level. The consequence was that he had to spend 
ETB1.4 million on medical costs for workers to be referred to and travel to and from a clinic in 
Adama. He was sure that having a crèche and medical clinic at the farm would help reduce labour 
turnover.  
A number of agribusiness managers had had to fend off political interference in their hiring 
practices. This included receiving anonymous emails strongly advising a firm to hire ‘our people’ 
for finance officer jobs (rather than people from other Ethiopian regions). It also included one 
farmer finding that woreda officials had placed selected workers on his farm without his 
knowledge and whom he would not himself have hired.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that while of course there are labour ‘issues’ these are not decisive 
in investing in Ethiopia or succeeding as a business and that there are clearly things businesses 
can do to make working conditions more attractive, without threatening their profitability, to 
help ease labour supply constraints.  
3.2.4 Energy 
Water and energy are intimately linked in a country where the great majority (more than 80 per 
cent) of energy is generated by hydroelectric power schemes on dams. The link is dramatized by 
the fact that, after poor rains, the 300 megawatt hydropower plant at the Tekeze dam (in Tigray) 
had to shut down for two days (ODI 2016: 15). Irrigation demand now trumps energy generation 
requirements at the Koka Dam in the Rift Valley: dry season irrigation outflows from the dam 
aggravate silt levels in the dam, which reduces storage capacity and can damage hydropower 
turbines (ibid: 21). Meanwhile, one farm manager explained to us that frequent power outtages 
and power surges play havoc with the maintenance of irrigation pumps, raising costs beyond just 
the need to stock and use generator fuel.  
Grid electricity is cheap in Ethiopia. At 2 cents/kilowatt it is cheaper than anywhere else in Africa 
(one farm manager reported electricity costs of 20 cents/kW in Uganda, for example). But power 
becomes fourteen times more costly the moment one has to use a generator, so agribusinesses, 
like other firms in Ethiopia (power being cited in most surveys of firm constraints), are 
perennially frustrated by unstable power supply. As the manager of a farm producing herbs on 
the outskirts of Hawassa put it, the unpredictability of the power supply has got worse: ‘we can 
manage but please tell us it’s happening!’ This man also said that running a generator costs the 
same as running three tractors. When there are diesel shortages for up to ten or twelve days, the 
problem becomes even worse.  
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 3.2.5 Foreign exchange  
At the fast rates of growth experienced in Ethiopia for over a decade the thirst for imports of all 
kinds, including imports of some of the consumer goods such as tomato paste, fruit juice and 
wine that agribusiness is producing domestically, has been hard to quench.  Profits can be earned 
by supplying the buoyant domestic market with a variety of imported goods, and/or by exporting 
agricultural, floricultural or other commodities.  If an enterprise is officially recognised as 
contributing to exports, its owners are permitted to acquire foreign exchange more easily than 
other capitalists, in the hope that they will use their foreign currency accounts to import the 
inputs needed to expand export production.  But it is possible, indeed very likely in the case of 
some coffee traders, for example, that capitalists can earn higher profits by supplying the 
domestic than the export market, partly because of the persistent overvaluation of the Birr and 
partly because the domestic market imposes fewer phyto-sanitary barriers and will accept lower 
quality products. It appears to have become worthwhile to ‘pretend’ to be an exporter of an 
uncompetitive product, for example beans from Merti farm, in order to ease the farm’s access to 
foreign exchange.  
There may be also be precautionary and other motives for holding foreign rather than domestic 
assets, for attempting to accumulate foreign exchange and to avoid strict government controls on 
how and when these funds are disbursed. These motives probably explain some of the data on 
the scale of mis-invoicing and illicit financial flows from Ethiopia (Kar, 2013). In this context, 
and fearful of the political consequences of shortages of imported basic commodities such as 
cooking oil, the government is keen to use the National Bank of Ethiopia to retain controls over 
traders’ and capitalists’ free access to foreign exchange.15 But some of their efforts to regulate 
access to foreign exchange have made it time consuming and more difficult for agribusiness 
exporters to operate efficiently, especially when changes in government regulations and National 
bank guidelines are rapidly introduced.  As is the case for coffee exports, it is not clear that the 
Ethiopian state has the capacity to control and closely regulate all trading activities that break the 
law or evade the myriad regulations.  Our conversations with the most successful agribusiness 
managers did not suggest that they were unable to overcome the delays and other difficulties in 
acquiring foreign exchange for their imported inputs. But it could be argued that more effort 
should be made to encourage and subsidise exports, rather than to micro-regulate access to 
foreign exchange.  
3.3 Infrastructure  
3.3.1 The tarmac ends where the sugar fields stop 
The Ethiopian government, largely from its own funds but also with external loan support, has 
spent billions of dollars on expanding the road network since the late 1990s, though all weather 
15  Growing difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange and a widening gap between the official and 
unofficial exchange rate have recently been reported (Capital, April 30th 2018).   
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 roads still cover less than a third of the estimated required road network.16 Expenditure has 
focused on building new roads and upgrading existing roads. This is combined with other major 
transport infrastructure investments, including the dry port at Mojo and the new Addis-Djibouti 
railway that began operations in 2018. But the state of transport infrastructure, roads above all, 
continue to be a major constraint on sustained economic growth and structural change. The new, 
Chinese built three lane highway reaching southeast from Addis Ababa has relieved some of the 
pressure on the old road heading towards Djibouti, a road that might be called the Balance of 
Payments Highway given the long lines of trucks congesting the traffic and edging slowly uphill 
laden with imported goods towards Addis. But there are other roads – Balance of Payments 
feeder roads – that are also significant economically but that have not received the same level of 
attention.  Investments appear to have been focused on trunk roads, but only about 10 per cent 
of Ethiopia’s rural population lives within two kilometres of an all-weather road. In addition, the 
level and quality of investment in road maintenance has been criticized (Foster and Morella, 
2011): one estimate is that only about 30 per cent of Ethiopia’s rural roads are in ‘good condition’ 
(Iimi et al, 2017: 8).  
A glaring example – though not the only one – is the road heading northeast off the main road 
south from Adama and running through the Upper Awash Valley, past the now privatised large 
commercial farms that used to be part of a massive state owned farm and, before that, 
landholdings of the emperor. Along this road is one farm that claims to supply 60 per cent of the 
entire demand within Ethiopia for fruit. Other farms produce passion fruit or ornamental plant 
cuttings for export. And at the western end of the road, after and around a bathing resort, is the 
large Wonji sugar estate (state owned). All weather surfacing of the road stops where the sugar 
fields end. Beyond the (inefficient) sprinklers of the sugar estate, the road is ungraded and rough 
and particularly vulnerable to damage from heavy seasonal rains. All the large agribusinesses 
along the valley complain about the condition of the road and wring their hands that the 
authorities have not delivered on a promise several years old (and incorporated in GTPI) to grade 
the road.17  
Prevarication on grading and resurfacing the road suggests a failure to prioritise an area with very 
high potential for generating foreign exchange and employment opportunities. The effects are 
more than mere inconvenience. Precisely because of the technical requirements and just-in-time 
production schedules of high value agricultural exports discussed above, infrastructure becomes a 
core issue. ‘The road is everything’, one production manager at a fruit processing plant insists: the 
poor condition of the road raises maintenance costs substantially for the 57 vehicles and ten large 
trucks the firm owns. Another farm packs its main output into aseptic aluminium-lined bags on 
site before these are sent by truck for transport to the Netherlands. The bad road shakes up the 
bags, wears through the lining, and causes fermentation: the firm estimates a regular loss of about 
16  UNDP (2014: 83) stated that in the 16 years up to 2013 Ethiopia had spent $7.1 bn on road 
construction, 77 per cent of which was from internal funds and 23 per cent from external grants and 
loans. 
17 The government’s main planning documents in recent years have been the Growth and Transformation 
Plan (GTP) I (launched in 2010/11) and GTP II (launched in 2015/16).  
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 12 per cent of the value of these exports thanks to the condition of the road. Another farm 
manager in the valley claimed that after the Federal Roads Authority had delegated responsibility 
to the Oromia roads authority, the regional authority had not delivered on their pledge to 
improve the road: this despite the fact that the road has been surveyed some ten times in the past 
fourteen years.  
The road has other economic costs too. Farmers in the Upper Awash Valley routinely complain 
that it is very difficult to attract good, qualified staff for senior posts. One reason is that it takes 
too long to travel even to Adama, let alone to Addis, where the better schools are for their 
families. For the staff they can attract, farms tend to run regular shuttles to Adama. Further, for 
one farm the state of the road meant that opportunities for co-location and productive clustering 
were missed. That farm had hoped a bottling company would set up a plant in the valley and 
there were negotiations; but reportedly, the bottlers pulled out -  largely because of the road.  
3.4 Rules and regulations: learning to swim without armbands 
There have been substantive changes in institutions responsible for promoting the 
industrialization of the Ethiopian economy in the recent period of rapid economic growth, 
changes that at times confound expectations of ‘path dependence’ or entrenched ‘culture’ or 
indeed the neo-patrimonialism that is supposed by many to dominate African societies. A good 
example is the development of the Ethiopian Investment Agency, and then its successor 
organization the Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC). Not only has the EIC changed its 
practices in ways that have clearly become more efficient (Sutton, 2019) and very much 
appreciated by many of the agricultural investors that we spoke to; but also its effects have spread 
beyond the EIC to the governance of the nascent industrial parks and to the operation of the 
National Export Council.  
But long-established repertoires of regulatory complication endure; and new difficulties have 
lately arisen too. Firms have to spend far too much time on ‘non-core’ business thanks to what 
they regard as an ‘institutional quagmire’. For some, this is a function of the government shifting 
from an earlier largely informal approach to a more formal set of rules but ‘overshooting’ and not 
working out how new rules would operate in practice. ‘There is a disconnect between levels of 
government: those at the top “get it” but lower down they don’t’. Others see it more as a 
function of different levels of bureaucracy, with lower level officials taking obsessively concerned 
to keep to the very letter, dotted ‘i’ and crossed ‘t’ of the regulations: ‘the laws are good but their 
implementation is terrible’. Others sense political tensions manifest in conflicting interpretations 
of rules and in contradictions between rules set at the centre and those followed (or ignored) in 
the regions. And on occasion the problem is a more mundane one of delays that could be 
avoided through making a corrupt payment. 
A particularly striking example illustrates some of these issues. To prevent soil exhaustion some 
farmers need to use – and therefore import – agricultural chalk. It is cheap. The transport costs 
are about three times the material cost. One enterprise needed to import a consignment of the 
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 chalk – in a mixed container also holding a tank for storing water on the farm - and told the 
supplier that they would have to have English labels (as specified in Ethiopian regulations). There 
was some negotiation but they agreed. The order went in in June 2017 and five weeks later it was 
shipped to Djibouti. But on the container it had a label with a brand composite name a little 
different from the specific product name that had been on the order. The container did, however, 
specify the exact ingredients and composition, which was identical to the other brand. The 
Ministry of Agriculture said it was the wrong material and for six months would not release the 
container. The firm had to pay for storage and this doubled the cost. Meanwhile, the water tank 
was badly needed but the firm also could not get this released. As of January 2018 they still did 
not have it. ‘If the papers are not 3000 per cent correct, it is stopped.’ The default position is red 
rather than green as it would be in the Netherlands.  
Processing work permits for key senior staff hired from overseas, including (or especially) experts 
recruited from other African countries, takes a great deal of time and effort and the relationship 
between these investors and the Home Affairs department is not streamlined. Similarly, there are 
complaints that the document registration agency is over-zealous in demanding, for example, that 
everyone present at a meeting must attend the office to sign the minutes, and that if the minutes 
include an agenda that does not exactly match the template the agency uses they have to be done 
all over again. 
A particular problem concerns the governance of investment. Investors appreciated the 
improvements in the way the EIC had come to deal with issues raised. But then the government 
devolved some responsibilities away from the EIC down to the Oromia regional government 
investment office. This office was thrown in at the deep end, as investors put it, and officials 
could not swim – indeed, they ‘had no armbands’. So on the one hand there has been 
institutional development and formalization – a step forward; but on the other there has been 
devolution and at least for a while two steps back.  
The way one farm manager, of a highly sophisticated global leading company, put it was that in 
Ethiopia it ‘is very easy to start all this – land is cheap, there are tax holidays, water is cheap, 
energy is cheap, it’s safe. Then it gets difficult. You never see a full list of requirements from 
officials – it’s always one step, resolve it, next step, deal with it, next step, wait… The rules are 
unclear. New rules are introduced without clarity – e.g. they introduced new fertiliser regulations 
without telling us [other investors raised this same example]. In Kenya it is more predictable. 
There’s less corruption in Ethiopia but it’s more unpredictable.’  
3.5 Easy/Difficult 
This comment, that it is very easy to begin with but then gets more difficult, captures something 
at the heart of the political economy of Ethiopian government efforts to secure rapid structural 
change. Just as achieving rapid growth episodes may be relatively easy but it is more difficult – 
but more important – to protect an economy against growth reversals (Pritchett, 2016), so there 
are often relatively easy and relatively difficult stages in particular sectors or economic activities. 
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 Hirschman wrote long ago (1968) about the easy and difficult stages of import substitution 
industrialization. Though not always for precisely the same reasons, the insight remains relevant 
now.  
One example is that it was fairly easy to set up a floriculture sector ab initio in Ethiopia. The state, 
owner of all the land, could grant concessions of cheap land in water abundant areas within close 
proximity to Bole international airport, soft loans from the state-owned DBE, income tax 
holidays, loss rescheduling provision and removal of tariffs and duties on capital goods, spare-
parts and inputs. There were abundant supplies of cheap labour. The state owned a relatively 
well-managed airline, Ethiopian Airlines, willing to carry cut flowers the short (compared to 
competitor countries) distance to major markets in Europe. Initially promotion and support for 
the sector were undertaken by a special council under the prime minister’s office; but later a lead 
agency (EHDA) was set up aiming to support the sector under a centralized system. Moreover, 
the sector received continuous international support especially from Dutch development 
cooperation that subsidized investors, encouraged institution building and provided firm level 
training.  
Until 2007/8 the sector enjoyed remarkably rapid growth with over 70 operational firms 
cultivating 922 hectares of land, which was more than fivefold growth compared to 2004/5. In 
the same period, the sector generated an average of USD 53 million per year and created direct 
employment for 34,720 people (Melese 2017a). In 2015, the total cultivated land reached 
1,623 hectares and 66 firms exported 50 million kilograms of flowers, generating US$ 225 million 
foreign exchange. 
After 2008 growth slowed dramatically (Figure 5), partly due to the global financial crisis that 
affected the global floriculture trade (Rabobank 2016). The total number of flower firms in 
Ethiopia peaked (at 86) in 2006/7 but the following years showed a considerable drop as many 
domestic firms ceased to operate. The number of operational domestic firms fell from 38 in 
2006/7 to 14 (including one joint venture) by June 2016, whereas the number of foreign firms 
increased from 26 to 66 in the same period (Melese, 2017: 1). Several of the exiting firms, 
especially the domestic ones, had joined the sector with little knowledge of or commitment to 
floricultural exporting. Thanks to the investment incentives and the ‘government brokers’ who 
provided ready-made feasibility studies, several firms opportunistically took advantage of the 
available finance and access to foreign exchange to pursue other businesses - focused on the 
domestic market rather than exporting - or left the country. Only some of the domestic firms that 
established turnkey, over-sophisticated greenhouses accumulated significant production 
capabilities; few were able to build the strong management and market relations needed to cope 
with shocks in the global market (ibid: 9). One consequence is that, as in Kenya (Moran, 2018: 5), 
a large and probably increasing proportion of Ethiopia’s floricultural exports is produced by a 
tiny number of very large scale foreign-owned firms. Below we discuss a number of other 
examples where both private and state owned firms in Ethiopia have run into the harder phase.  
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 Figure 10. Growth rate of exports of cut flowers from Ethiopia, 2005-17 
(annual percentage change in volume of exports) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ITC Trade Map, 2018 
There is a tendency not only to imagine that investing to build a factory achieves an advance to 
the cutting edge of modernity and structural transformation, but also to believe that there are few 
problems in investing in the old fashioned, ‘simple’ techniques of producing agricultural 
commodities.  We suggest that building imported turnkey factories is often ‘easy’ and can rapidly 
be achieved; it is far harder and far more technologically complex to ensure that farms supply the 
throughput necessary for the factories to operate efficiently at full capacity. 
Part of the difficulty in achieving consistent growth in agricultural throughput is that this requires 
massive and sustained in investment in R&D – to alleviate disease outbreaks  – and in training to 
produce the farm managers, irrigation engineers, plant pathologists, vets, etc. required. The policy 
neglect of these investments is an obvious constraint on the expansion of production and 
exports. For example, the newly installed tomato processing machinery, producing the 
domestically popular Merti brand of paste in a small sachet form making it affordable to a low-
income market, has never operated at full capacity. This is partly because only a small proportion 
of the company’s available land can be planted with tomatoes as the result of long-standing 
problems with parasitic weed infestation by orobanche. Efforts to overcome this problem at the 
nearby Melkassa Research Centre are hampered by the fact that Ethiopia’s stock of Agricultural 
Science Technology and Innovation research expertise is far smaller (and younger) than in most 
Sub-Saharan African economies, as well as by the high proportion of its funding devoted to 
wages and salaries rather than other research costs (Alemu et al, 2016: 8-9; ASTI, 2018).  
There are plenty of other examples: as one farm manager put it, ‘under capacity bites like a 
crocodile.’ Among them, we have already noted above the relative ease in importing juicing and 
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 evaporator machinery (from Parma) but the considerable difficulty, technically and politically, in 
securing a reliable throughput of passion fruit. On a larger scale, there has never been much 
difficulty in Ethiopia in setting up tanneries and leather goods producing factories – including 
recent large-scale foreign investments by the Chinese shoemaker Hua Jian and the Pittards 
factory supplying Costco with gloves. But there is protracted and deep capacity underutilization 
in the sector (USAID 2013; Oqubay 2015). Neither the industry nor the government has 
managed to resolve the long-standing difficulties in securing a reliable supply of good quality 
hides and skins. Hides and skins are a by-product of the meat industry and constrained by the 
organization and level of demand in that industry; poor animal husbandry and widely dispersed 
shoat flocks and cattle holdings lead to poor quality and small hides and skins. Although Ethiopia 
has the largest livestock population in Africa and one of largest ten in the world, the off take is 
low (7 per cent for cattle and 35 per cent for shoats). With the surge in textile production in the 
country’s new industrial parks, a very similar problem is affecting cotton production. Textile 
factories have been built, there are some 20 spinning mills in the country and as of early 2018 
there were around a dozen further spinning mills in the pipeline. But the factories continue to 
depend on imports. And existing spinning mills are operating at half capacity. Imports, duty free 
and produced in countries with substantial subsidies for cotton growers, were rising to new 
peaks, while cotton output in Ethiopia has shrunk and quality is not good enough for the high 
grade demand in the new textile and garment factories (USDA 2018).  
3.6 Development on speed: the principle of the hiding hand vs. the principle of the 
throttling hand 
An outburst of protests and violence in Ethiopia in late 2016 interrupted fieldwork for this study. 
Political protests, triggered by opposition to a planned expansion of the land area covered by 
Addis Ababa, sparked direct attacks in particular on a number of businesses owned by foreign 
investors in Oromia. These included the mobilisation of a large crowd of young men in the 
Upper Awash Valley, who descended on the AfricaJuice Tibila farm and laid waste to its 
buildings and equipment, trampling pills from the clinic’s medical supplies into the ground, 
setting fire to buildings, damaging vehicles, looting some machinery, but not harming the main 
processing equipment. At least part of the same group then moved further down the valley 
towards other farms: at one farm that was also part of our study they arrived at the gates but were 
talked down. Perhaps the farm managers were successful in negotiating with the protesters 
because the managers had a much more sustained record of offering decent employment 
opportunities to young people. The exact reasons why one farm was so badly affected and others, 
through threatened, avoided direct damage are complex and beyond the scope of this report. But 
the violence, and the state of emergency and ongoing instability that followed, serve to underline 
the fundamentally socio-political dynamics behind the various constraints discussed above. 
Tensions over access to land and water, a deep-seated structural problem in Ethiopia’s political 
economy, and a possible deflective scapegoating of foreign investors who could be associated 
with the central state all combined to fuel the instability and the uncertainty faced by investors.  
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 Clapham (2017) argues that throughout Ethiopia’s history the highlands have been the source of 
political power and the more peripheral lowlands the source of economic reproduction, leading 
to enduring political tensions. 18 This would seem to characterize well the basic dynamics in 
lowland areas of Oromia. Oromia accounts for a large swathe of southern Ethiopia and for the 
largest single ethno-linguistic grouping in the country. It has been the main source of political 
protest against the EPRDF since 2016. Recent tensions are closely related to the policies of the 
EPRDF and to what might be called the ‘political economy of being in a hurry’ in Ethiopia. The 
EPRDF, notably under the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, hitched the wagon of its political 
survival and legitimacy to the star of rapid economic development (De Waal, 2013: 473). A 
determination to bring about rapid economic growth and structural change, as the source of 
legitimacy, gathered momentum in the wake of the 2005 elections. The EPRDF suffered a major 
challenge to its dominance in those elections, whose results were cancelled and which were 
followed by a spate of imprisonments and a state of emergency. The government shifted strategy 
and pushed for faster economic change. But in a way what followed was a race between the 
pursuit of development and the challenge from rising expectations that came with a demographic 
bulge, wider access to education, a surge in construction of universities around the country, 
infrastructure improvements, and rising inequality.  
In the course of this drama, two principles or logics have come to be at loggerheads. On the one 
hand, Hirschman’s principle of the ‘hiding hand’ has been in play. Hirschman (1967), writing on 
large-scale development projects, argued that sheer optimism led planners to embark on such 
projects but that the optimism that was necessary to get a project off the ground ‘hid’ knowledge 
of the inevitable complexities and obstacles to successfully implementing the project. Once the 
project was underway and began to reveal extremely challenging problems, officials were often 
able to find creative ways to address those problems. Hirschman argued that had they clearly 
anticipated the extent of the difficulties involved, planners would never have approved the 
project in the first place. In this sense, the ‘hiding hand’ of over-optimism created a situation in 
which engineers, planners, and policy officials were eventually forced to develop capabilities they 
otherwise lacked. On the other, throttling hand, another principle may be in play. A state that 
races to attract investors by offering land concessions at fire sale prices, that commits huge sums 
of public expenditure to infrastructure upgrading and to finding the quickest way to complete toll 
roads and railways, and that flags up that it will build a ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ (the 
GERD), the largest hydro-dam scheme in Africa (self-funded), all with a somewhat shallow 
depth of bureaucratic capabilities and an asphyxiating balance of payments constraint, risks 
choking off the source of sustained growth, the spread of linkages, and political legitimacy.19  
There is no law determining the outcome of the interplay of these principles. We have found 
evidence (in horticultural air-freighting, for example) of both a remarkable ‘adaptive capacity’ 
18 See also Markakis (2013). 
19  The GERD was expected to be finished in 2018 but this has been put back. One example of 
unexploited scope for linkages is in the construction of the Addis Light Railway. Basic stone tile slabs 
lining the way into the underground section of the railway were shipped from China when they might 
without difficulty, and only a slight delay, have been quarried and made in Ethiopia.   
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 (Giezen et al 2015) and institutional learning and creativity but also evidence of stifling blockages. 
The challenge for policy makers – and for those outsiders keen to support them – is to work out 
ways in which the dynamics of the hiding hand may get the better of those of the throttling hand. 
Our policy conclusions, below, are intended to provide some basis for policy and institutional 
design in support of this cause.  
One example involves the fiscal regime for foreign investors and its implications. The tax regime 
is extremely favourable. Investors in horticultural exports can be exempt for up to ten years from 
paying business income tax and can benefit from exemptions on customs duties on imports. But 
one implication is that investors may effectively have to act like a state in the area around where 
they operate. The central state does not have sufficient fiscal resources fully to support the 
provision of schools, health services, and energy. Investors often find they are encouraged to 
contribute to the costs of provision of local school buildings and services, to health facilities, and 
to other local services. They and their employees may also feel obliged to make contributions to 
the GERD. In a way this is in their interests. It helps them to establish local legitimacy if they are 
associated with improvements in school buildings and so on. But not all investors are equally 
good at behaving in state-like ways. This may lead to higher variation in the stability of 
performance and in vulnerability to local political challenge. That in turn is no foundation for a 
coherent strategy to maximise foreign exchange, employment, and linkages to the domestic 
economy.  
There are two other implications concerning the fiscal regime that affect investment prospects in 
horticulture. First, the absence of significant taxation lessens the compulsions to develop 
organised and state-business relations to solve collective action problems the sector faces such as 
the need for more infrastructure or domestic technical and research capacity.20 Second, the tax 
incentives for domestic actors to invest in horticulture face stiff competition because of high 
profits available in urban real estate in a context of growing urban demand and negligible 
property taxation (Goodfellow, 2017; Gebreyesus 2019). 21  Thus, the speed with which the 
government has attempted to set up several sectors via generous tax holidays now means that far 
more coherent production strategies beyond tax incentives will be required to extend horticulture 
exports and address the more difficult stages of its expansion. 
 
20 In the case of Mauritius, for instance, export taxes on sugar, the main export commodity in the 19th and 
most of the 20th century, had several positive effects on state-society relations and in increasing the 
productive capacity of the sugar sector (Bräutigam, 2008). The export tax encouraged the private sector to 
organize and to build their capacity to interact with the government over time. Also, it helped both the 
state and society to solve collective action problems they faced in building skills and in supporting 
research on sugar. 
21 73 per cent of investment from the top 10 domestic investors between 2006 and 2010 was in real estate 
or construction (Goodfellow, 2017: 558).  And 60 per cent of all investment by Ethiopian diaspora in the 
period between 1994 and 2014 was in real estate and related services (ibid: 559). The diaspora invested 
four times more in this sector than in manufacturing, despite numerous official incentives in place for the 
latter (ibid: 559). 
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 Conclusion and policy principles 
The findings of this research, and the analytical framework that these findings provoked us to 
develop, suggest that policy makers may need to reconsider priorities for resource allocation in 
Ethiopia (and elsewhere). We have highlighted the importance of designing economic policies 
that not only generate rapid growth but also protect against growth collapses. The balance of 
payments constraint is perhaps one of the most powerful influences affecting prospects for 
achieving these objectives. And relaxing this constraint involves, above all, generating a rapid rate 
of growth of foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, a fundamental objective of economic 
policy in developing countries like Ethiopia is and has to be to generate a rapid rate of growth of 
wage employment.  
Pursuing these objectives involves decisions about allocating resources between activities and 
decisions about how to sustain dynamics within evolving sectors rather than merely how to 
stimulate the initial set up of a sector or a new set of activities. A common principle on which to 
base resource allocation decisions is the distinction between ‘sectors’, on the assumption and 
historical evidence that there are particular gains from the rapid expansion of, above all, 
manufacturing industry. This has been the basis for industrial policy design. Industrial policy for 
developing economies has received renewed attention in international policy and academic 
circles. It has been championed by proponents across a broader range of intellectual and 
ideological backgrounds than was previously the case. But at the same time there have been rising 
fears that this is too late, that industrial policy cannot, in the face of ‘premature 
deindustrialization’, secure the development gains that it did in the past.  
Our study offers a way ahead. It suggests that policy officials and donor agencies need to think 
more in terms of distinctions among economic activities than between traditional sectors. This is 
because the distinctions between sectors have largely broken down, the relations between sectors 
have deepened, and the variation within each sector has grown to be larger than the variation 
between them. More than this, the evidence (internationally and from close observation in 
Ethiopia) points to the scope for the misallocation of resources based on a form of category 
error – the mistaken assumption of development gains on grounds of categorical distinctions that 
are no longer helpful.  
Thus, the principal criteria that ought to guide the setting of priorities are whether a given activity 
has a proven potential to generate fast growth in export earnings and in wage employment (direct 
and indirect). These criteria may be used to influence the choice of activities given special tax 
incentives, of how to select between water uses and access to land, and which infrastructure 
spending to prioritise.  
But selective incentives – cheap land concessions, tax exemptions, access to foreign exchange, 
guaranteed water rights, and so on – can only be effective if combined with the discipline of 
‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ tying incentives to a clear record of strong performance in 
export markets. This in turn requires effective and regular monitoring. Indeed, one of the highest 
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 priorities for policy in Ethiopia has to be investment in the more regular collection of reliable 
data on economic activities that can support structural change, growth, and protection against 
growth collapses.  
In Ethiopia, there has been a commitment to new industrial endeavours, especially the 
promotion of an expanding number of industrial parks, whose benefits in terms of net foreign 
exchange earnings and wage employment are not yet clearly established. We suggest that officials 
should consider instead the gains from investing in activities with already proven capacity to 
generate significant foreign exchange earnings and wage employment opportunities at relatively 
low additional cost to the public purse: these activities are high value horticultural/agricultural 
exports, and promoting them involves a ‘race to the top’ (Moran 2018).  
This would mean prioritising measures to overcome a raft of constraints holding back the 
expansion of high value, technically sophisticated ‘industrial’ agricultural exports and preventing 
enterprises undertaking these activities from proceeding from the relatively ‘easy’ early stages to 
the more ‘difficult’ stages of deeper productive success.  
The key priorities here include the following. Government should push to the front of the queue 
for infrastructure spending allocations to repair and upgrade roads linking areas with 
concentrated potential for agricultural exports to major trunk roads. There needs to be a big push 
for the development of Ethiopian agricultural research and development capabilities (facilities 
and PhD-trained staff) in particular focused on export crops. The government needs to do 
‘political settlement’ deals at various levels to ensure a progressive way of resolving land and 
water usage disputes so that local employment opportunities are maximised (and clearly 
understood) and so that foreign exchange gains are prioritised. The National Export Council, 
together with the Ethiopian Investment Commission, needs to be given authority to accelerate 
institutional changes geared to promoting foreign exchange and employment generating activities.  
And policy officials need to give greater priority to the promotion of champions or star 
exporters. The evidence internationally (especially from Chile and Colombia and also from 
Kenya) suggests that successful integration into global horticultural value chains depends on a 
handful of ‘export superstars’ (Moran, 2018; see also Cramer and Sender 2015 on South Africa). 
There are empirical similarities between successful supply chain creation in manufacturing and 
horticulture in developing economies – success in both activities requires ‘export superstars that 
are born big, start out as highly productive firms, and grow fast’ (Moran, 2018: 3). Indeed, the 
increasing role of international standards (phyto-sanitary, quality, voluntary ‘ethical’ etc.) has only 
led to a greater concentration within horticultural production. The costs of certification are too 
high to bear for most smallholders. For example, in 2004 smallholders dominated Kenyan 
horticulture exports but as importer country standards became more rigorous, the smallholder 
share of export revenue fell by 2011 to less than 30 per cent (Moran 2018: 12). It is no wonder 
that interviewees for our study struggled with their efforts to promote smallholder outgrower 
schemes, which appeared to be more significant as a political gesture than a productive strategy. 
At the same time, Ethiopia’s domestic fruit and vegetable market has been dominated by a huge 
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 ‘Ethiopian’ conglomerate owner with interests spread across many different sectors but without 
anything like the determination to specialise and upgrade of the Kenyan Vegpro (founded by an 
immigrant Asian family who had fled Uganda).  
In other ways too the significance of industrial agriculture has escaped policy frameworks in 
Ethiopia. Thus, for example, horticulture firms (many employing 800-1,200 workers) cannot 
benefit from the support for soil analysis and fertilizer mixes through the well-funded 
Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), because this is focused exclusively on smallholder 
farmers. Yet these large-scale horticultural firms are at the same time not within the domain of 
industrial policy focused on leather, garments, etc. They have not received the same attention 
from government in, for example, setting up sector-specific institutes (as for leather and textiles) 
(Oqubay, 2015). 
We have suggested that policy officials may want to revisit priorities for resource allocation and 
that there may be a trade-off between promoting industrial parks and promoting the deepening 
of horticultural exports. But there are important implications also from the research and analysis 
in this study and the design of policy for industrial parks themselves. First, we have argued that 
there is an important distinction between the easy and difficult phases of developing productivity 
in particular sectors and that policy officials need to pay more attention to this distinction. This 
point will apply just as much to the development of industrial parks – and seems already to be 
affecting the parks. Second, to make a real success of the industrial parks will require potential 
linkages to be realized between, especially, textile and garment factories to domestic raw material 
producers. The implications of our analysis have a strong bearing on any strategy to promote 
backward linkages from urban factory production to Ethiopian raw material input supply.  
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